How can eID cards improve the security and usability of authentication protocols?

From the design to the security and risk analysis

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Introduction to eID cards

General features and security components

2

eID cards in real-world scenarios

Practical examples involving eID cards

3

What about security?

A methodology to analyse protocols based on eID cards

4

Conclusions

1

Introduction to eID cards

General features and security components

What are eID cards?

- Official identity document in **many countries**.
- Replace **paper-based** version.
- Personal data of the owner are **printed** on the plastic surface.
  - Visual security elements such as holograms **prevent counterfeiting**.

Security features

- From a security perspective, eID cards are equipped with:
  - a **contactless chip**;



Security features

- From a security perspective, eID cards are equipped with:
  - a **contactless chip**;
  - an **X.509 certificate**;

Private Key

X.509 certificate



Security features

- From a security perspective, eID cards are equipped with:
  - a **contactless chip**;
  - an **X.509 certificate**;
  - a customizable **PIN code**;

PIN code

Security features

- From a security perspective, eID cards are equipped with:
  - a **contactless chip**;
  - an **X.509 certificate**;
  - a customizable **PIN code**;
  - a **machine-readable zone** (MRZ).

Security features

The X.509 certificate

- Each eID card has a personal X.509 certificate.
- The certificate provides guarantee on the **integrity** of the attested data.
- Moreover, it provides a **digital signature** scheme:
  - eID cards can **sign** objects by using their **private keys**;
  - other entities can **verify** the correctness of the signature by using the eID cards' **public keys**.

Private Key



Our experience

- Joint work with *Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato Italiano* (IPZS, the **Italian Government Printing Office and Mint**).
  - Shared laboratory ***DigiMat Lab*** (2017-2020);
  - In-house company ***Futuro & Conoscenza*** from 2021.

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2

eID cards in real-world scenarios

Practical examples involving eID cards

Real-world scenarios



Physical identity proofing



Remote identity proofing



Advanced scenarios

Online authentication

Physical identity proofing

- Accessing data from eID cards…
  - … requires the MRZ, needed to derive the key for mutual authentication.
- Then, data can be accessed by interacting with the contactless chip.

Physical identity proofing



- This process is officially acknowledged by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
- The use of eDocuments allow for automatic identity verification processes.



Source: ICAO, Doc 9303: Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 9

Remote identity proofing

- More and more operations can now be performed totally online…
  - … just imagine opening a bank account.
- High assurance on people's identity is required.
  - eDocuments can be used to provide the needed assurance.



Advanced scenarios

Clocking-in/out

Pull printing

eID cards replacing identification badges

Custom applications to improve clocking processes

eID cards to properly identify employee

Online authentication





Total-desktop



Cie ID

Total-mobile



Cie ID

Hybrid

Online authentication

Total-desktop solution



Online authentication

Total-mobile solution



Online authentication

Total-mobile solution





Online authentication

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

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

Online authentication

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



Online authentication

Hybrid solutions



Given the different requirements that may arise, we consider two hybrid solutions:

- a **one-shot solution** that can be used without any prior operation (except for card registration), relying on QR codes;

Online authentication

One-shot hybrid solution – Involved entities



User

eID card



Browser

Service Provider





Identity Provider

eIDApp

Online authentication

One-shot hybrid solution – Authentication



Online authentication

One-shot hybrid solution – Authentication

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

Online authentication

One-shot hybrid solution – Authentication



Online authentication

One-shot hybrid solution – Authentication



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

Online authentication

Hybrid solutions



Given the different requirements that may arise, we consider two hybrid solutions:

- a **one-shot solution** that can be used without any prior operation (except for card registration), relying on QR codes;
- a **two-phase solution** requiring a preliminary operation (enrollment), relying on QR codes and push notifications.

Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Involved entities



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Enrollment

Online authentication

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Two-phase hybrid solution – Enrollment



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Enrollment

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Two-phase hybrid solution – Enrollment



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Enrollment



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Authentication



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Authentication

Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Authentication



Identity Provider



Firebase Cloud Messaging Server



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Authentication



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Authentication

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Two-phase hybrid solution – Authentication



Online authentication

Two-phase hybrid solution – Authentication



3

What about security?

A methodology to analyse protocols based on eID cards

eID cards from a security perspective

Multi-Factor Cryptographic Device: «a hardware device that performs cryptographic operations using one or more protected cryptographic keys and requires activation through a second authentication factor»

Source: NIST Special Publication 800-63b

eID cards from a security perspective

Possession

Multi-Factor Cryptographic Device: «a hardware device that performs cryptographic operations using one or more protected cryptographic keys and requires activation through a second authentication factor»



Knowledge

Source: NIST Special Publication 800-63b

Challenge-response protocols



Challenge-response protocols

Response
(challenge signed with the eID card's private key)





Identity Provider

Challenge-response protocols

Response unencrypted with the eID card's public key



Identity Provider



Challenge-response protocols

Checks on the values



Identity Provider



Protocol analysis

A two-level approach

1

Security Analysis

To detect the attackers that manage to compromise the protocol

Protocol analysis

Security analysis

To detect the attackers that manage to compromise the protocol, we perform two different kinds of analysis:

1. **Combinatorial Analysis**: relying on attackers' capabilities on the authentication factors. It is fast and thus helps prune the set of attackers to test, but may not detect some advanced attacks.

Protocol analysis

Security analysis – Combinatorial analysis

Explicit attackers: manage to break the protocol by compromising all the authentication factors.



Protocol analysis

Security analysis – Combinatorial analysis

Attackers		Authentication Factors Compromised			
		****			
Personal Computer Thief	PCT	🔒	🔒	🔒	🔓
Mobile Device Thief	MDT	🔒	🔒	🔓	🔒
Card Thief	CT	🔒	🔓	🔒	🔒
Authenticator Duplicator	AD	🔓	🔒	🔒	🔓
Eavesdropping Software	ES	🔓	🔒	🔒	🔒
Shoulder Surfer	SS	🔓	🔒	🔒	🔒
Social Engineer	SE	🔓	🔒	🔒	🔒
Man in the Browser	MB	🔒	🔒	🔒	🔓
Man in the Mobile	MM	🔓	🔓	🔓	🔒

Protocol analysis

Security analysis

To detect the attackers that manage to compromise the protocol, we perform two different kinds of analysis:

1. **Combinatorial Analysis**: relying on attackers' capabilities on the authentication factors. It is fast and thus helps prune the set of attackers to test, but may not detect some advanced attacks.

2. **Formal Analysis**: relying on formal methods (a specification language and a model checker). It can be computationally expensive, but manages to find even more complex categories of attacks.


Benvenuti alla Scuola Infanzia - Anno scolastico 2018-2019
Benvenuti


Please insert your userId
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
Benvenuti alla Scuola Infanzia - Anno scolastico 2018-2019
Benvenuti


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
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
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
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


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
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
17:18
62%
Mar 12 mar
I WIND
Authentication request
Open for more infos
Sistema Android
Debug USB collegato
Tocca per disattivare il debug USB
GESTISCI LE NOTIFICHE


Please insert your userId
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
Operation Details
Login
09/16/2020 7:35:04 PM
High School of Trento
Authorize
Reject
Please insert your userId
CA00000AA
Next
Please insert your userId
CA00000AA
Next


Inserisci il PIN
MARIO ROSSI
Il tuo PIN:
••••5678
Please insert your userId
CA00000AA
Next
Please insert your userId
CA00000AA
Next


AUTENTICAZIONE
Autenticazione in corso...
Trattieni la Carta in prossimità dello smartphone fino al termine dell'operazione
Please insert your userId
CA00000AA
Next
Please insert your userId
CA00000AA
Next


Welcome,
Error


11:12
56%
Operation Details
Operation
Login
Date and Time
09/16/2020 7:35:04 PM
Online service
High School of Trento
Attacker is accessing the same service!
Not enough details for login!

Protocol analysis

Security analysis – Formal analysis



Protocol analysis

A two-level approach

1

Security Analysis

To detect the attackers that manage to compromise the protocol

2

Risk Analysis

To evaluate the risks connected with the successful attackers detected

Protocol analysis

Risk analysis

Likelihood

Impact

Risk = Likelihood × Impact

Probability of an attack happening

Consequences in case of the attack was successful

Protocol analysis

Risk analysis

OWASP Risk Rating Methodology

		Likelihood		
		Low	*Medium*	*High*
Impact	*Low*	Note	Low	Medium
	Medium	Low	Medium	High
	High	Medium	High	Critical

Risk = Likelihood × Impact

Probability of an attack happening

Consequences in case of the attack was successful

Protocol analysis

Final results

At the end of the analysis, we can know:

- a **list of attackers** that manage to compromise the protocol;
- an indication of the **risk** for each attacker.

Mitigations

Example: OTP on the mobile application



Mitigations

Example: Root detector



Mitigations

Example: Additional login information



4

Conclusions

Conclusions







References

- Marco Pernpruner, Roberto Carbone, Silvio Ranise, and Giada Sciarretta. “The Good, the Bad and the (Not So) Ugly of Out-of-Band Authentication with eID Cards and Push Notifications: Design, Formal and Risk Analysis”. In: *Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy* (CODASPY '20). https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375727
- Marco Pernpruner, Giada Sciarretta, and Silvio Ranise. “A Framework for Security and Risk Analysis of Enrollment Procedures: Application to Fully-remote Solutions based on eDocuments”. In: *Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Security and Cryptography* (SECRYPT 2021). In press.
- Matteo Leonelli, Umberto Morelli, Giada Sciarretta, and Silvio Ranise. “Secure Pull Printing with QR Codes and National eID Cards: A Software-oriented Design and an Open-source Implementation”. In: *Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy* (CODASPY '21). https://doi.org/10.1145/3422337.3447847
- OWASP. “OWASP Risk Rating Methodology”. https://owasp.org/www-community/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology

Thank You!

For more information:

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mpernpruner@fbk.eu
https://st.fbk.eu